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Abstract
In July 2021, the European Union proposed the creation of a carbon border adjustment
mechanism, a trade mechanism that would levy a carbon price against imported goods. This
mechanism, the first of its kind, has the potential to address weaknesses in the EU’s existing
domestic cap and trade system and create a financial incentive for other nations to reduce their
carbon emissions. However, legal experts have raised concerns that this mechanism may violate
the rules of the World Trade Organization. If another member state raises a complaint against the
measure, the European Union will be forced to navigate the World Trade Organization’s dispute
settlement process to determine the legality of the measure. By examining similar trade measures
defended under Article XX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, this thesis explores
how such a dispute might play out. Ultimately, this thesis asks the question of whether the rules
of the World Trade Organization are too narrow to allow for the kinds of trade measures needed
to drastically decrease global carbon emissions and prevent further catastrophic climate change.
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Introduction
It is estimated that the global average temperature has warmed more than one degree

Celsius over the past century, with roughly one-tenth of the globe warming more than 2C.1 The
effects of this human-caused warming are already being felt today. The frequency of extreme
weather events such as heat waves, droughts, and heavy rainfall have increased globally, glaciers
and sea ice are melting, and, as a result, sea levels have risen.2
At the 2015 United Nations COP21 summit, 196 countries became party to the Paris
Agreement, a landmark legally binding international treaty which “aims to strengthen the global
response to the threat of climate change, in the context of sustainable development and efforts to
eradicate poverty.”3 To do so, parties to the treaty commit to the common goal of limiting
greenhouse-gas emissions in order to keep the global average rise in temperature below 2C
compared to preindustrial levels, while also striving for the more ambitious goal of 1.5C.4 Parties
are required to set their own emissions reductions targets, known as “nationally determined
contributions” (NDCs).5 According to the Paris Agreement, NDCs should represent a given
country’s highest possible emission reduction ambition, while reflecting a given country’s
“common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of different

1

Chris Mooney & John Muyskens, Dangerous new hot zones are spreading around the world, Washington Post
(2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2019/national/climate-environment/climate-change-world/ (last
visited Dec 10, 2021).
2

Ove Hoegh-Guldberg et al., Global Warming of 1.5 oC: Impacts of 1.5°C of Global Warming on Natural and
Human Systems, IPCC 177 (2018)., Randal Jackson, The Effects of Climate Change, Climate Change: Vital Signs of
the Planet , https://climate.nasa.gov/effects (last visited Dec 10, 2021).
3

Paris Agreement to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, art. 2(1), Dec. 12, 2015,
T.I.A.S. No. 16-1104.
4

ibid, art. 2(1)(a)

5

ibid, art. 4(2)

1

national circumstances.”6 NDCs are to be updated every five years, with successive NDCs
becoming more ambitious over time, and with the ultimate goal of achieving net-zero carbon
emissions by the middle of the century.7 In November, 2021, the UN gathered again in Glasgow,
Scotland at the COP26 to reaffirm the Paris Agreement’s commitment to limiting warming below
2C. The decisions of this conference are codified in the Glasgow Climate Pact. Thus far, 130
countries have submitted new NDC targets, many of which are stronger than their original
pledges.8
A 2018 report by the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) estimates
that if global emissions continue at current levels, the average temperature will likely rise by
1.5C by just 2040. Under this report's least optimistic predictions, global temperatures could rise
4.4C by the end of the century under countries’ currently proposed policies.9 More conservative
estimates still place warming at 2.7C.10 According to the IPCC, just a 2C increase could mean
significantly more droughts, habitat loss, extreme heat, poverty, and rise in sea level than a 1.5C
increase.11 For island nations threatened by rising sea levels like the Maldives, the difference
between 1.5C and 2C is the difference between life and death.12 Under the best case scenario, if
6

ibid, art. 4(3)

7

ibid, art. 4(9).

8

CAT Climate Target Update Tracker, (2021), https://climateactiontracker.org/climate-target-update-tracker/ (last
visited Dec 11, 2021).
9 Adam Taylor

& Harry Stevens, 2C or 1.5C? How global climate targets are set and what they mean, Washington
Post (2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2021/11/10/15c-2c-climate-temperature-targets-cop26/ (last
visited Dec 10, 2021).
10

Glasgow’s 2030 credibility gap: net zero’s lip service to climate action, Climate Action Tracker (2021), https://
climateactiontracker.org/publications/glasgows-2030-credibility-gap-net-zeros-lip-service-to-climate-action/ (last
visited Dec 11, 2021).
11

Melissa Denchak, Paris Climate Agreement: Everything You Need to Know, NRDC (2021), https://www.nrdc.org/
stories/paris-climate-agreement-everything-you-need-know (last visited Dec 10, 2021).
12 Abha

Bhattarai, Maldives minister says efforts aren’t enough: ‘The difference between 1.5 and 2 degrees is a
death sentence for us.’, Washington Post (2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/climate-environment/2021/11/13/
cop26-glasgow-climate-deal/ (last visited Dec 10, 2021).
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the NDCs proposed as a part of COP26 are fully implemented, the earth will warm an estimated
1.8C by the century’s end. However, thus far, no single country has adopted short-term policies
sufficient to achieve this goal, indicating that, without a radical change, NDCs will likely remain
empty promises.13 Furthermore, absent any enforcement mechanisms in the Paris Agreement,
there is little that developing countries, which are most harshly affected by climate change, and
countries that are on track to meet their NDCs can do to force others to play their part.
The failure of parties to meet the terms of the Paris Agreement thus far raises the question
whether the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and climate treaties in
general are sufficient to address the urgent problem at hand. Instead of relying on these treaties
alone, some have suggested that the world needs a reexamination of the rules that govern global
economic activity – including the rulebook of the World Trade Organization (WTO), the
intergovernmental body that regulates and facilitates 98 percent of all global trade.14 In this vein,
an idea that is growing in popularity is that, as the consequences of carbon emissions affect all
people and the measures needed to adapt to a changing climate will be incredible expensive,
companies should no longer be allowed to emit for free. In recent years, some countries have
taken it upon themselves to act independently towards this goal and put a price on pollution by
creating domestic cap-and-trade and carbon pricing schemes. While these systems have proven
effective at reducing carbon emissions, they are limited to domestic industries and fail to limit
emissions from imported goods.15
13

Glasgow’s 2030 credibility gap: net zero’s lip service to climate action, Climate Action Tracker.

14

Jessica F. Green, Follow the Money, 2021, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2021-11-12/followmoney (last visited Dec 11, 2021)., What is the WTO?, https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/thewto_e.htm (last
visited Apr 13, 2022).
15

How cap and trade works, Environmental Defense Fund, https://www.edf.org/climate/how-cap-and-trade-works
(last visited Dec 11, 2021).
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In July 2021, the European Union proposed a solution to this problem in the creation of a
carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM), a trade measure which would put a price on the
carbon emissions of products imported from abroad that is equivalent to the cost of emissions
within the EU.16 This measure has the potential to be an effective tool to reduce emissions within
the EU while encouraging global cooperation in emission reductions, and has already inspired
discussions of developing similar measures in other countries. However, despite the EU’s efforts
to comply with existing WTO rules, the CBAM and similar measures run the risk of violating the
rules of international trade.17
Using the CBAM’s potential violation of WTO rules as a case study, this thesis explores
the question of whether current trade rules are too restrictive to allow for the kind of
comprehensive policies needed to meet the Paris Agreement’s goal of limiting global warming to
below 2C to mitigate the effects of climate change. Ultimately, this thesis argues that, as the
WTO espouses a commitment to sustainable development, an exception to the rules of global
trade must be made for trade measures designed to reduce carbon emissions. While free trade
should be protected, the global effort against climate change must take priority.
The first chapter of this thesis outlines the background and workings of the EU’s carbon
border adjustment mechanism and discusses similar measures proposed in other countries. The
second chapter then explores the legality of this measure by examining exceptions to the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The primary sources for this chapter are past WTO

16

European Commission, Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE
COUNCIL establishing a carbon border adjustment mechanism COM/2021/564 final (2021), https://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52021PC0564 (last visited March 12, 2022).
17

James Bacchus, Legal Issues with the European Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, Cato Institute (2021),
https://www.cato.org/briefing-paper/legal-issues-european-carbon-border-adjustment-mechanism (last visited Dec
11, 2021).

4

dispute settlement cases involving trade measures aimed at environmental protection. After
examining the legality of the CBAM, the third chapter of this thesis questions the WTO’s current
climate framework and proposes a few solutions to address the conflict between the global
climate and regimes.

5

Chapter 1 - An EU Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism
The European Union Emissions Trading System
In 2005, the European Union implemented the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS).
The goal of the EU ETS was to create a financial incentive for domestic industries to reduce their
greenhouse gas emissions and to encourage the development of greener production technologies.
The EU ETS was the first emissions trading system of its kind and today remains the largest
carbon market in the world. The system covers all 27 EU member countries, as well as all four of
the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) countries: Norway, Iceland, Switzerland and
Liechtenstein.18
The EU ETS functions as a ‘cap and trade’ system, in which the EU sets a ‘cap’ on the
amount of greenhouse gasses that can be emitted domestically from certain sectors over a period
of time. The EU then issues a fixed number of ‘allowances’ to companies, which correspond to
the number of tons of carbon dioxide that a given company can emit for a calendar year. If
companies emit more carbon dioxide than they are allowed, they must purchase extra allowances
from companies that emitted less carbon and therefore have leftover allowances (hence the
‘trade’ part of ‘cap and trade’). The system not only limits emissions from European companies
to a fixed goal, but also incentivizes them to transition to cleaner technologies in the future. This
is achieved by lowering the overall emissions cap over time, reducing the number of allowances
that are distributed and driving up the price of allowances on the market place. The EU ETS
currently covers the energy sector, manufacturing industry, and aviation sector, including airlines

18

EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), European Commission, https://ec.europa.eu/clima/eu-action/euemissions-trading-system-eu-ets_en (last visited Nov 11, 2021).
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operating in the European Economic Area, which together account for approximately 40 percent
of the EU’s total emissions.19
Since its introduction, the ETS has been the cornerstone of the EU’s climate change
policy and has been relatively successful in reducing EU-wide carbon emissions. Between 2008
and 2016, it is estimated that the emissions trading system prevented more than 1.2 billion tons
of carbon dioxide emissions, equivalent to 3.8 percent of total EU emissions compared to a
world without the ETS.20 Furthermore, since 2018, reforms to the ETS have caused the price of
carbon emissions to rise drastically, with total emissions from the sectors covered by the system
falling in step with the rising prices. Emissions from the regulated sectors fell by 8.7 percent in
2019.21 As a part of the “Fit for 55” package, the European Commission has proposed tightening
the emissions cap further and increasing the carbon price. There have also been talks of
expanding the ETS to include the heating and transportation sectors, the latter of which would
cover the high-emitting shipping industry.22
The EU ETS has also been an inspiration for other countries. Similar carbon markets are
now operating or under development in Canada, China, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, and
the United States, which the EU hopes will all eventually be combined to create an international

19

European Commission, EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), Climate Action - European Commission (2016),
https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets_en (last visited Sep 13, 2021).
20

Patrick Bayer & Michaël Aklin, The European Union Emissions Trading System reduced CO2 emissions despite
low prices, 117 PNAS 8804–8812 (2020).
21

Paul Hockenos, The EU’s Emissions Trading System is Finally Becoming a Success Story, Energy Transition
(2020), https://energytransition.org/2020/11/the-eus-emissions-trading-scheme-is-finally-becoming-a-success-story/
(last visited Nov 10, 2021).
22 Yuliia

Oharenko, Strengthening EU Emissions Trading Scheme to Back up Climate Ambitions, IISD SDG
Knowledge Hub (2021), https://sdg.iisd.org:443/commentary/guest-articles/strengthening-eu-emissions-tradingscheme-to-back-up-climate-ambitions/ (last visited Nov 9, 2021).
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carbon market, as allowed for in article 6 of the Paris Agreement.23 As of January 2020,
Switzerland has become the first country to link its domestic carbon trading system with the EU
ETS, providing an example for possible future integrations.24
Despite the relative success of the EU ETS in reducing domestic emissions, critics have
argued that the price of allowances on the carbon market remains too low relative to the social
cost of carbon emissions. Furthermore, the threat of carbon leakage has prevented the EU ETS
from effectively reducing emissions from certain high-emitting sectors. Carbon leakage occurs
when businesses transfer their production to countries with more relaxed regulations in order to
avoid the costs of complying with domestic climate policies and to maintain their
competitiveness on the global market.25 This allows them to circumvent policies aimed at
reducing emissions and puts businesses that switch to carbon efficient production practices at a
competitive disadvantage. Furthermore, the increased transportation involved with moving an
industry abroad and importing goods back into the original country can potentially be a large
source of carbon emissions. Alternatively, complying with emissions standards could drive up
the price of goods produced in the original country, leading consumers to turn to ‘dirtier’
imported products with lower price tags.26 Overall, carbon leakage from the EU ETS could have
the potential to raise global emissions even higher than they would be in a world without the

23

EU Emissions Trading System: International carbon market, European Commission, https://ec.europa.eu/clima/
eu-action/eu-emissions-trading-system-eu-ets/international-carbon-market_en (last visited Nov 10, 2021).
24

Council of the EU, Linking of Switzerland to the EU emissions trading system - entry into force on 1 January
2020 (2019), https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2019/12/09/linking-of-switzerland-to-the-euemissions-trading-system-entry-into-force-on-1-january-2020/ (last visited Nov 12, 2021).
25

European Commission, Carbon leakage, Climate Action - European Commission (2016), https://ec.europa.eu/
clima/policies/ets/allowances/leakage_en (last visited Sep 13, 2021).
26

European Commission, Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, Taxation and Customs Union, https://
ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/green-taxation-0/carbon-border-adjustment-mechanism_en (last visited Nov 10,
2021).
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trading system.27 For this reason, it is of great importance that the EU prevents carbon leakage as
much as possible.
Under the current system, the EU ETS prevents carbon leakage from occurring by
allocating a number of free emissions allowances to industries deemed most at risk of carbon
leakage. These are industries that are energy-intensive in their production practices and highly
trade-exposed.28 As companies in these sectors are allowed to emit for free, they have no
incentive to move their production outside of the EU. At the same time, they have no financial
incentive to reduce emissions. Under the revised EU ETS Directive, sectors at the highest risk of
carbon leakage will receive 100 percent of their allowance allocations for free until at least 2030.
To put pressure on sectors less exposed to carbon leakage to reduce emissions, all free
allocations will be phased out completely between 2026 and 2030.29 To further prevent leakage,
the EU ETS also allows member states to compensate electricity intensive sectors through
national aid schemes for increases in electricity costs that have resulted from the EU ETS. This
leakage-mitigation strategy will continue to at least 2030, although member states must have
their compensation schemes approved by the European Commission before any aid can be
administered.30
While free allocations and compensation schemes for electricity costs prevent the
creation of additional emissions from carbon leakage, they also allow industries to continue

27

Charikleia Karakosta, Carbon Leakage and Industrial Innovation, Climate Policy Info Hub (2016), https://
climatepolicyinfohub.eu/carbon-leakage-and-industrial-innovation.html (last visited Nov 12, 2021).
28

ibid.

29

EU ETS: Revision for phase 4 (2021-2030), European Commission, https://ec.europa.eu/clima/eu-action/euemissions-trading-system-eu-ets/revision-phase-4-2021-2030_en (last visited Nov 11, 2021).
30

European Commission, Carbon leakage.
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polluting for free and provide no incentive for emission reductions. The phasing out of these
efforts, however, leaves the EU ETS in need of a new carbon leakage mitigation strategy.

The Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism: A New Solution to Carbon Leakage
With the goal in mind of preventing carbon leakage from the sectors that will no longer
be issued free allowances in 2026, the European Commission in July 2021 adopted a proposal
that establishes a carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM) within the EU.31 As a part of
the new European Green Deal, the CBAM is intended to function as a solution to the problem of
carbon leakage by creating a level playing field between products produced domestically and
foreign imports. To prevent producers from leaving the EU to avoid rising carbon prices, the
CBAM will put a price on the carbon emissions of imported products that mirrors the price that
would have been paid had the products been produced within the EU. As member states of the
EU ETS, the four EFTA countries will be exempt from import costs under the CBAM.32 In a
nutshell, the CBAM will function as a tax on imports which places a price on the carbon
produced by imported goods.
Though the CBAM can be seen as an extension of the EU ETS, in its initial stages, the
CBAM will not apply to all sectors that fall within the emissions trading system. Only the
imports of electricity, cement, aluminum, fertilizer, iron, and steel will be subject to a carbon
price in the measure’s initial phase.33 These sectors were chosen as their manufacturing processes
are carbon intensive, making the domestic production of these products highly vulnerable to
31

Proposal establishing a carbon border adjustment mechanism.

32

ibid, annex II(1).

33

Proposal establishing a carbon border adjustment mechanism, annex I.
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carbon leakage. Together, these sectors account for 47 percent of industrial greenhouse gas
emissions covered by the ETS.34 The feasibility of imposing a border adjustment mechanism on
these goods was also a factor in their selection.35

The CBAM in Practice
Like the EU ETS, the CBAM will operate through the purchase of certificates by
importers, the price of which will be tied to the allowance certificate costs within the EU ETS.
The price of certificates will fluctuate based on the weekly average auction price of EU ETS
allowances expressed in euros per ton of carbon dioxide emitted.36 Importers of goods in sectors
covered by the CBAM will have to register and buy CBAM certificates through national
authorities. These importers must declare by May 31st each year the total quantity and the related
carbon emissions of the goods that they imported into the EU in the previous year. At this time,
the importers will surrender the equivalent CBAM certificates, which would have been
purchased from the authorities in advance.37 Unlike the EU ETS, there will be no cap on the
number of CBAM certificates available to importers.38 This serves to maintain a consistent
carbon price between the ETS and the CBAM, as well as a consistent price for operators from all
countries.39 Furthermore, if a foreign producer can prove that they have already paid for the

34

Peter Chase & Rose Pinkert, The EU’s Triangular Dilemma on Climate and Trade, The German Marshall Fund of
the United States 6 (2021).
35

Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism: Questions and Answers, European Commission.

36

Proposal establishing a carbon border adjustment mechanism, (21).

37

ibid, art. 6.

38

ibid, (22).

39

ibid, art. 8.
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carbon emitted in their production processes in the country of origin, the number of certificates
required by the EU will be reduced to account for the price already paid.40
To reduce the number of certificates they must buy, importers will therefore naturally
favor products produced with greener production technologies or in countries with their own
carbon prices. This means that countries without a national carbon price or strong environmental
regulations, such as Russia, China, and Turkey, will likely take the largest hit to their economies
as a result of the CBAM.41 For this reason, the CBAM could incentivize non-EU countries to
adopt stronger production regulations and carbon prices of their own in order to remain
competitive among EU importers.42 The CBAM is therefore a unique opportunity for the EU to
unilaterally encourage other countries to make good on their Paris Agreement commitments.

One challenge of the CBAM will be determining the amount of carbon embedded in
goods produced outside of the EU. Under the CBAM, importers will be expected to provide the
data used to determine the embedded emissions in the products that they import. This data must
be collected using methods laid out in Annex III of the CBAM proposal and will be subject to
verification procedures following its submission.43 When emissions data for a given import is not
available, EU importers will be able to use a list of default values on carbon dioxide emissions
for different products to determine the number of necessary certificates.44

40

ibid, art.9.

41

Mehreen Khan, EU carbon border tax will raise nearly €10bn annually, Financial Times, July 6, 2021, https://
www.ft.com/content/7a812f4d-a093-4f1a-9a2f-877c41811486 (last visited Nov 12, 2021).
42

Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism: Questions and Answers, European Commission, https://ec.europa.eu/
commission/presscorner/detail/en/qanda_21_3661 (last visited Nov 12, 2021).
43

ibid, art. 7.

44

Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism: Questions and Answers, European Commission.
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Most revenue collected as a result of the CBAM will go directly to the EU budget. In the
beginning, this revenue will largely go to the EU’s COVID-19 recovery plan, which emphasizes
investment in green technologies.45 The text of the CBAM proposal states that while revenue
generation is not an objective of the measure, the mechanism is estimated to raise above EUR 2.1
billion in the year 2030.46 Others have estimated CBAM revenues to be much higher at nearly
EUR 10 billion annually.47

The Future of the CBAM
While the full text of the regulation necessary to implement the CBAM is included in the
EU’s CBAM proposal, the CBAM will not be fully implemented until 2026. Between 2023 and
2025, there will be a transitional phase in which importers will have to report the total amount of
emissions embedded in their goods without paying an adjustment price.48 This period is intended
to create a smooth transition for authorities and involved businesses, giving all involved parties
time to prepare any necessary administrative infrastructure and to gain experience with the
system. By the end of this period, authorities will evaluate how the CBAM is working, assess
impacts of the CBAM, and discuss expanding the mechanism to other industries. One possibility
would be to expand the mechanism to include “indirect” emissions from imports, which consist
of emissions produced from the electricity used in the production of a given good.49

45

Proposal establishing a carbon border adjustment mechanism, Explanatory Memorandum, (4).

46

Proposal establishing a carbon border adjustment mechanism, (1.4.3).

47

Khan, EU carbon border tax will raise nearly €10bn annually.

48

Proposal establishing a carbon border adjustment mechanism, art. 32-35.

49

ibid, (52).
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Prior to the EU’s CBAM proposal, the world’s only carbon border adjustment was in the
state of California. This system links with California’s carbon pricing scheme, but applies only to
electricity imported from other US states.50 Since the European Commission announced the
development of the CBAM, however, Canada has expressed interest in creating a similar
mechanism to function with its domestic carbon market, though no concrete plans have been
released.51 Japan has expressed plans to create a domestic carbon pricing scheme that would also
feature a border adjustment mechanism in the years to come.52 Democrats in the US Senate have
also proposed a similar carbon border tax, although the absence of a domestic emissions trading
system or carbon price indicates that this proposal is unlikely to actually materialize.53 Several
US states have implemented or proposed their own carbon pricing schemes, but there has been
no indication of plans for a system at the federal level.54 As these proposals indicate a growing
global interest in carbon pricing, an international carbon market could be on the horizon. For
now, however, the EU still has a long way to go to prove to the world that carbon border
adjustments should have a place in global trade.

50

Stefan U. Pauer, Including electricity imports in California’s cap-and-trade program: A case study of a border
carbon adjustment in practice, 31 The Electricity Journal 39–45 (2018).
51

Department of Finance Canada, Exploring Border Carbon Adjustments for Canada, Government of Canada
(2021), https://www.canada.ca/en/department-finance/programs/consultations/2021/border-carbon-adjustments/
exploring-border-carbon-adjustments-canada.html (last visited Nov 12, 2021).
52

Kohei Okazaki et al., Japan begins discussions on carbon pricing framework, Nomura (2021), https://
www.nomuraconnects.com/focused-thinking-posts/japan-begins-discussions-on-carbon-pricing-framework/ (last
visited Nov 12, 2021).
53 Alan

H. Price et al., Democrats Introduce Carbon Border Adjustment Legislation, Wiley (2021), https://
www.wiley.law/alert-Democrats-Introduce-Carbon-Border-Adjustment-Legislation (last visited Nov 12, 2021).
54

Ben McWilliams & Simone Tagliapietra, Carbon border adjustment in the United States: not easy, but not
impossible either, Bruegel (2021), https://www.bruegel.org/2021/02/carbon-border-adjustment-in-the-united-statesnot-easy-but-not-impossible-either/ (last visited Nov 12, 2021).
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Chapter 2 – Exploring the Legality of the CBAM within WTO framework
Opposition to the CBAM
Several countries have already expressed opposition to the CBAM proposal since its
announcement, many of which are major trading partners of the EU. In a joint statement, the
governments of South Africa, China, Brazil, and India expressed their “grave concern” about the
measure, which they saw as discriminatory and against the principles of equity.55 Similarly,
Russia’s economic development minister stated that the country is “extremely concerned by
attempts to use the climate agenda to create new barriers” and believes that the new measure
contravenes WTO rules.56 A spokesperson for the Chinese Ministry of Ecology and Environment
echoed the call that the measure goes against WTO principles.57 Australia also expressed
opposition, with Prime Minister Scott Morrison calling carbon tariffs “trade protectionism by
another name,” and U.S. Special Presidential Envoy for Climate John Kerry has met the measure
with skepticism.58
For the EU, this wave of external opposition to the measure is likely unsurprising. As the
CBAM is intended to put financial pressure on countries with weak emissions standards, some

55

Joint Statement issued at the conclusion of the 30th BASIC Ministerial Meeting on Climate Change hosted by
India on 8th April 2021, South African Government (2021), https://www.gov.za/nr/speeches/joint-statement-issuedconclusion-30th-basic-ministerial-meeting-climate-change-hosted (last visited Dec 23, 2021).
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degree of international pushback is to be expected. Thus far, the countries speaking out most
vocally in opposition to the CBAM are those mostly likely to be negatively impacted by the
measure. For instance, Russia and China are the two largest exporters of goods that will be
affected by the CBAM.59 Brazil, South Africa, and the US will also see an impact on their iron
and steel industries.60
Speaking to the European Economic and Social Committee in September 2021, Deputy
Director-General of the WTO Jean-Marie Paugam stated that, in principle, “nothing in the
multilateral trade rules precludes the implementation of an ambitious environmental policy by
any WTO Member,” provided that this measure is “not discriminatory or does not disguise
primarily competitive or protectionist motives.”61 Paugam avoided directly passing judgment on
the EU’s CBAM, but stated that when determining its legality, “the devil will lie in the details”
of the proposal.62 He further stated that the proposed mechanism is “contentious and complicated
in the WTO context” and that “the potential for trade friction is real.”63
Although the text of the CBAM proposal states that the measure was developed with the
intent of being WTO-compatible, as Paugam implied, whether this is actually true has yet to be
determined.64 The question of whether carbon border adjustments of any kind are WTO
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compatible has been the subject of debate among legal scholars for years, with most coming to
the conclusion that a mechanism’s legality will depend on the specific details of its
implementation.65 With the level of opposition that the CBAM has faced thus far, it is very likely
that at least one of the countries impacted by the measure will argue that it violates one or more
trade rules and bring a claim against it to the WTO.66 If so, the EU’s CBAM would be the first
carbon border adjustment challenged before the WTO and set a precedent for future measures.67
If a complaint against the measure is launched by another member state, the CBAM would be
subject to the WTO’s dispute settlement process, the workings of which are briefly explained
below.

The WTO Dispute Settlement Process
The dispute settlement process allows one or more states to take multilateral action
against other WTO member states which they believe to be violating trade agreements or failing
to meet legal obligations.68 The rules that govern the multi-stage dispute settlement process are
laid out in the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) in Annex 2 of the WTO agreement.
When a dispute arises, the primary parties include the complaining country, the country
that launches the dispute, and the responding country, which defends its disputed trade
mechanism. The process is moderated by the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), a special
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branch of the WTO’s General Council that is made up of all WTO member states.69 It is the job
of this body to establish a panel of legal experts for every given case, as well as to accept or
reject the findings of the panel or the results of an appeal. The DSB is also tasked with
monitoring states’ implementation of rulings and has the authority to allow for retaliation when
countries fail to comply with rulings.70
Although the WTO’s dispute settlement procedure is similar to that of a court, the
organization states that the point of the process is not to pass judgment, but to encourage the
discussion of the issue at hand between the parties, which will hopefully settle the dispute among
themselves.71 If states are unable to resolve a conflict during an initial consultation stage of the
process, the case is handed over to a panel of experts for assessment. After a period of
deliberation, the panel submits a final report that concludes whether a WTO agreement is
violated by the disputed trade measure and provides suggestions as to how the measure may be
altered to comply with rules. This report becomes an official ruling unless rejected by a
consensus of the DSB, including the member in whose favor the ruling was made.72
At this point, either party can appeal the panel’s ruling to the WTO’s Appellate Body
(AB).73 Any appeals must be based on issues regarding legal interpretation rather than a
reexamination of facts.74 Once the AB’s report has been adopted by the DSB, it must be
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unconditionally accepted by the parties to the dispute.75 Therefore, if the AB finds that a measure
violates WTO rules, the member state responsible for the measure must promptly comply with
recommendations to make the measure consistent with trade rules or risk the suspension of
relevant concessions.76
Although a trade measure may eventually be found to violate trade rules, the WTO does
not require responding states to halt the operation of disputed measures until a ruling has been
made against it. This means that if a complaint is brought against the CBAM, the EU will still be
allowed to implement the mechanism until an AB report finding the measure to violate rules has
been adopted. With this in mind, the rest of this chapter outlines the WTO rules that
complainants will likely argue that the CBAM violates and explores how a possible dispute
brought against the mechanism might play out.

Legal challenges to the CBAM
Any complaint brought against the CBAM will likely concern the rules of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), a WTO agreement that covers international trade in
goods.77 James Bacchus, a legal scholar at the libertarian think tank the Cato Institute, has
written about the legal challenges to the CBAM that the EU can expect to encounter. Bacchus
was twice chairman of the WTO’s Appellate Body, making him one of the world’s top scholars in
WTO jurisprudence. In his assessment of the CBAM’s WTO compatibility, he argues that the
CBAM may be found to be inconsistent with one of several core GATT rules. While the terms of
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the CBAM may be subject to change before its 2026 arrival, Bacchus predicts that any disputes
raised over the CBAM are likely to concern its inconsistency with the GATT’s “most-favorednation” and “national treatment” rules.78 In a nutshell, these rules mean that the CBAM must be
proven to adhere to two principles of non-discrimination: non-discrimination between both
domestic and foreign products, as well as non-discrimination between foreign suppliers.79
The most-favored-nation principle, outlined in Article I of the GATT, requires that all
advantages granted to the imports of one WTO member must also be applied to all other WTO
members.80 The CBAM could violate this rule by discriminating between like products imported
from different WTO member countries based on the intensity of their embedded carbon
emissions.81 The WTO however, provides no absolute definition of “like products.” In the past,
trade agreements have suggested that criteria such as “the product's end-uses in a given market,
consumers' tastes and habits…, and the product's properties, nature, and quality” can be used in
determining the similarity of products.82 Any interpretations of the term, however, should be
examined on a case-by-case basis, as “no one approach to exercising judgment will be
appropriate for all cases.”83
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If a dispute were to arise, it could be difficult for the EU to justify treating two of the
same product differently based on the “cleanliness” of their manufacturing processes (for
example, imported steel produced in a blast furnace and steel produced using an electric arc
process).84 Joost Pauwelyn and David Kleimann note that past WTO rulings have defined
products as “like” based on their competitive economic relationship in the marketplace, so
products such as steel produced in two separate countries would likely be classified as like
products irrespective of their respective carbon footprints.85 According to Bacchus, the EU also
runs the risk of violating the most-favored-nation rule if it uses the climate actions and
environmental regulations of other WTO member states as the grounds for which imports will
require the purchase of emissions certificates.86
The CBAM may also be inconsistent with the GATT Article III national treatment rule.87
This rule requires that imported products must be treated as favorably as products produced
domestically.88 Although products imported under the CBAM will be subject to the same carbon
price as products within the scope of the ETS, any free emissions allowances in the ETS that are
not fully phased out before the implementation of the CBAM could put the measure in violation
of this principle. Existing free allowances would provide double protection for European
products and put imports at a disadvantage.89
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At the moment, the EU is facing a great deal of domestic opposition to the CBAM from
several interest groups such as Fertilizers Europe, Aluminum Europe, and EUROFER, the
European Steel Association. These organizations are urging the European Commission to
continue to issue free allowances within the ETS past the 2026 deadline.90 As the efficacy of the
CBAM remains untested, these firms have expressed fears that the loss of free emissions
allowances would make them uncompetitive.91 If the EU were to give in to these demands and
continue the allowances, the CBAM would almost certainly be found to violate the national
treatment rule. Sabine Weyand, head of the Commissions's trade department acknowledged that
the EU would be unable to meet industry demands, stating “it is very clear that the moment you
start phasing in CBAM, you have to start phasing out free allowances.”92
Bacchus also argues that the free emissions allowances currently issued under the ETS
may actually already be a violation of WTO rules, which place a limit on government subsidies
where they “distort global trade.” In recent years, 43 percent of all emissions allowances in the
ETS have been allocated to domestic firms for free.93 However, no WTO members have brought
a claim against the EU for this aspect of the ETS thus far, and any future claims are unlikely to
occur as long as the EU makes good on its claims to discontinue the issue of free allowances
before the implementation of the CBAM.94
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Finally, Bacchus argues that a third area of concern for the EU could stem from the
CBAM applying charges on imported products that are in excess of the customs duties ceilings
that the EU agreed to in its WTO schedule of commitments. He sees this violation as likely to
occur, considering that the price of CBAM certificates will only rise over time as the EU tightens
its climate regulations.95 In response to a claim brought against the mechanism on this ground,
the EU will likely argue that the CBAM is a requirement of an internal regulation as opposed to a
border measure, and therefore is exempt from this rule. If this is found to be the case, the EU
could allow the price of emissions certificates to rise over time without fear of exceeding their
agreed upon ceilings on customs duties. However, as the obligation of importers to pay the price
of emissions certificates is triggered “by virtue of the event of importation,” Bacchus is skeptical
of the CBAM’s ability to pass as an internal regulation if brought into a WTO dispute.96

Justifications for the CBAM: GATT Article XX
Despite the fact that the CBAM may be found to violate one of several WTO rules, it
may still be allowed to be implemented. Article XX of the GATT provides several exceptions
under which trade measures that pursue specific purposes, such as measures "necessary to
protect human, animal or plant life or health" (Art. XX(b)) and measures "relating to the
conversation of exhaustive natural resources" (Art. XX(g)), but otherwise violate certain core
GATT provisions may be justified.97 As trade measures aimed at environmental protection often
require some sort of discrimination between like products based on their production processes,
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Art. XX has proven to be greatly important for the defense of environmental regulations. For this
reason, the article has been called a “guardian” of the environment.98
In order to justify a measure under Art. XX, a country must prove that the measure passes
a “two-tiered” test. The first step a country must take is to prove that the goal of the measure falls
within the scope of one of the article’s subsections. The EU will likely argue that the CBAM falls
under one of three exceptions, which have been used in past WTO cases to defend trade
measures aimed at environmental protection. The following exceptions allow for measures:
Art. XX (a): necessary to protect public morals;
Art. XX (b): necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health;
Art. XX (g): relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such
measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic
production or consumption;
To qualify under one of the above exceptions, the EU then must be able to prove with
little doubt that the CBAM is either necessary to protect public morals, is necessary to protect
human, animal or plant life or health, or relates to the conservation of exhaustible natural
resources within EU territory.
If the CBAM is found to meet the terms of an exception, the next hurdle the EU will face
will be proving that the mechanism is consistent with the rules of Art. XX’s introductory
paragraph, known as the chapeau. The chapeau states that the GATT shall not prevent the
adoption or enforcement of measures that address the specified concerns, as long as these trade
measures are not applied in a manner which “would constitute a means of arbitrary or
98
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unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail” or are a
“disguised restriction on international trade.”99 The defending member state must also prove that
a less restrictive trade measure could not achieve the goal of the disputed measure as
effectively.100
So as not to be seen as a disguised restriction on trade, the EU has been careful to make
clear that the sole motivation for the CBAM is for reasons of protecting human health and the
environment.101 However, past rulings of the AB regarding the chapeau indicate other problems
the CBAM may face. In US – Shrimp, the AB stated that member states cannot “require other
members to adopt essentially the same comprehensive regulatory program, to achieve a certain
policy goal, as that in force within the member’s territory, without taking into consideration
different conditions which may occur in the territories of those members.”102 In the case of the
CBAM, this rule could provide grounds for other WTO members to complain that, as the cost of
emissions certificates will be based off of those in the ETS and therefore reflect EU-specific
supply and demand conditions, the measure is discriminatory.103 Furthermore, the AB has
condemned measures that have an “intended and actual coercive effect on the specific policy
decisions made by foreign governments.”104 If the CBAM is found to discriminate between
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imports based on whether the exporting country has a carbon pricing system, the CBAM could
be difficult to justify before the WTO.105
In the March 2021 resolution “towards a WTO-compatible EU carbon border adjustment
mechanism,” the European Parliament specifically names the existence of Art. XX (b) and (g) as
factors in their development of the CBAM, indicating that they anticipated the need to fall back
on these exceptions even before the CBAM was fully developed.106 Ultimately, the decision of
whether the CBAM meets the requirements of the Art. XX exceptions and chapeau will fall on
the specifics of the structure and application of the CBAM.107 However, the panel and AB will
rely on legal precedent to guide their decision. The rest of this chapter will now detail the past
use of the Art. XX exceptions described above to justify trade measures aimed at environmental
protection in order to examine their possible use in justifying the CBAM.
Article XX (b): measures necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health
Art. XX (b) allows for the justification of trade measures proven to be “necessary to
protect human, animal or plant life or health.” To be justified under Art. XX(b), a trade measure
must both “fall within the range of policies designed to protect human, animal or plant life or
health” and be “‘necessary’ to fulfill the invoked policy objective.”108 To determine the actual
objective of a trade measure, the panel examines “both the design and structure of a challenged
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measure.”109 The panel must ultimately decide that the measure’s true intent is relevant to the
exception and that the measure is necessary to achieve this goal.
In the past, countries have attempted to defend a wide range of trade measures under Art.
XX(b). Policy objectives that these measures sought to achieve include banning products
containing asbestos and reducing air pollution caused by gasoline consumption.110 Through the
deliberation of these dispute settlement cases, the terms of the article have been further defined.
In Thailand – Cigarettes, for instance, the panel recognized that states are “clearly allowed…to
give priority to human health over trade liberalization.”111 In the case Korea – Beef, the panel
stated that “the more vital or important the common interests, the easier it would be to accept the
measure as ‘necessary’.”112 This idea was further clarified in EC – Asbestos, where the AB found
that the elimination, or reduction, of the well-known, and life-threatening, health risks posed by
asbestos fibers” was “both vital and important in the highest degree.”113
A case in which Art. XX(b) was used to justify a policy objective aimed specifically at
environmental protection is Brazil – Retreaded Tyres. In this 2006 dispute, the European
Communities (EC) challenged a ban on the importation of retreaded tires implemented by Brazil,
stating that the ban was disguised protectionism of Brazil’s domestic tire market.114 Brazil
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justified the ban by stating that, as retreaded tires have a shorter lifespan than new tires, their
importation ultimately leads to faster waste accumulation than that of new tires. They further
argued that, although retreading and reusing tires reduces waste, a country only benefits from
this process if it is retreading tires consumed within its territory, so “by retreading and exporting
its tires, the European Communities reduces its own waste burden, not Brazil's.”115 Furthermore,
as the burning of tires releases a number of pollutants, the disposal of waste tires requires special
technology. Areas with large amounts of discarded tires easily accumulate water, creating
breeding grounds for mosquitoes that carry diseases such as malaria and yellow fever in
countries with warm climates like Brazil’s.116 For this reason, Brazil responded to the EC’s
claim by acknowledging that the ban was inconsistent with GATT rules, but sought to justify it
under Art. XX(b) as a measure necessary to protect human life or health.
In their report on the dispute, the panel stated that, to justify the measure under XX(b),
they must be certain that the measure provides a “material contribution to the achievement of its
objective.”117 Member states cannot simply “establish the existence of risks to ‘the environment’
generally, but rather establish more specifically risks to animal or plant life or health.”118 At the
same time, however, the panel rejected the EC’s claim that the contribution towards the
protection of life or health must be quantifiable or immediately observable.119 Furthermore, in
their report, the panel made their first-ever statement justifying measures related to climate
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change, stating that “the results obtained from certain actions – for instance, measures adopted in
order to attenuate global warming and climate change, or certain preventive actions to reduce the
incidence of diseases that may manifest themselves only after a certain period of time – can only
be evaluated with the benefit of time.”120
Ultimately, although both the panel and AB acknowledged that Brazil’s measure met the
requirements of Art. XX(b), both parties found that the measure did not meet the requirements of
the Art. XX chapeau because it failed to implement the measure in a non-discriminatory way.121
However, despite this ruling, this case is still regarded as a landmark case for environmental
policy.122 Based on the precedent of Brazil – Retreaded Tyres and the other cases mentioned
above, it is clear that a justification of the CBAM under Art. XX(b) is plausible. To defend its
case successfully with this exception, the EU will need to clearly establish that, along with
complying with the chapeau, in reducing global carbon emissions, the CBAM is necessary to
protect human, animal or plant life or health.

Article XX (g): measures relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources
Art. XX(g) allows for measures found to relate to the conservation of exhaustible natural
resources, as long as said measures are created “in conjunction with restrictions on domestic
consumption or production.”123 In several cases in the past, including US – Shrimp and US –
Gasoline, panels have been willing to “engage with evolving environmental norms” and proved
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open minded to new interpretations of what constitutes an “exhaustible natural resource.”124 In
the dispute China – Rare Earths, for instance, the panel found that policies justifiable under
XX(g) are not limited to those just aimed at “preservation” and can instead include a “full range
of policy considerations and goals” such as the sustainable use of resources.125 The AB further
noted in this dispute that the precise definition of “conservation” will vary depending on the
exhaustible natural resource in question.126
The understanding of “exhaustible natural resources” was further expanded in the dispute
US – Shrimp, in which the US defended a measure intended to protect endangered species of sea
turtles using Art. XX(g). After finding that the most significant source of mortality for
endangered sea turtles was accidents involving shrimp trawlers, the US created regulations in
accordance with the Endangered Species Act of 1973 requiring the use of “turtle excluder
devices” by all shrimp trawlers.127 This rule was later expanded to ban the importation of certain
shrimp products that were not fished with the use of turtle excluder devices in areas where sea
turtles are likely to be found. In 1997, India, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Thailand brought a joint
complaint against this ban, arguing that the measure violated several WTO rules.128
Remarkably, the AB agreed with the US that measures to protect endangered sea turtles
would be permissible under Art. XX(g). Although, as argued by the complainants, living beings
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are considered renewable resources, the AB recognized that they are “susceptible of depletion,
exhaustion and extinction, frequently because of human activities” and therefore “just as ‘finite’
as petroleum, iron ore and other non-living resources.”129 The AB held that they “do not believe
that ‘exhaustible’ natural resources and ‘renewable’ natural resources are mutually exclusive.”130
The AB report further states that the term ‘“exhaustible natural resources” must be read “in light
of contemporary concerns of the community of nations about the protection and conservation of
the environment.”131 Furthermore, the AB found that the generic term “natural resources” in Art.
XX(g) is not “static” in its content or reference but rather “by definition, evolutionary.”132
The US, however, lost the dispute after the circumstances of the ban were found to
violate the Art. XX chapeau by arbitrarily discriminating between WTO member states.133 The
US had been providing technical and financial assistance in implementing the required
regulations to some countries, while not affording the countries that filed the complaint the same
advantages.134 After the US made recommended changes to the ban, upon appeal the measure
was found to comply with the rules of the chapeau and was justified under Art. XX(g).135
Along with US – Shrimp, another important environmental case that relied on Art. XX(g)
is US – Gasoline. In this case, Brazil and Venezuela launched a complaint that the “Gasoline
Rule” under the US Clean Air Act treated imported gasoline less favorably than domestic
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gasoline.136 This rule established baseline figures for gasoline sold within the US using different
rules for domestically produced and imported gasoline, with the goal of “regulating the
composition and emission effects of gasoline to prevent air pollution.”137
In its report, the panel sided with the complainants, finding that the measure violated the
Art. III:4 national treatment rule by affording more favorable sales conditions to domestic
gasoline.138 The US then sought to defend with measure under Art. XX(g), stating that clean air
was an exhaustible natural resource, threatened by the air pollution that the “Gasoline Rule”
sought to prevent. Venezuela argued against the use of this exception, stating that the original
intent of Art. XX(g) was only to cover resources existing in finite quantities, such as coal and
oil.139 Surprisingly, the panel accepted the US’s argument that breathable air can indeed be seen
as an exhaustible natural resource and defended under Art. XX(g).140 Despite this admission,
however, the panel still found that the details of the measure constituted “unjustifiable
discrimination” and acted as a “disguised restriction on international trade,” violating the rules of
the Art. XX chapeau.141 The AB upheld this decision, but noted that this ruling does not “mean,
or imply, that the ability of any WTO member to take measures to control air pollution or, more
generally, to protect the environment, is at issue” and emphasized that members have autonomy
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in determining their own environmental measures as long as they recognize “the need to respect
the requirements of the General Agreement and the other covered agreements.”142
With US – Shrimp and US – Gasoline as precedents, the EU may find success in an Art.
XX(g) defense of the CBAM. Just as the AB in both cases found that sea turtles and clean air,
resources typically seen as renewable, can still be considered “exhaustible,” the EU may be able
to argue that the CBAM has been created in defense of another non-traditional, yet exhaustible
natural resource – namely, “air at a livable temperature in a climate fit for human habitation” or a
stable atmosphere, whose composition can be altered by the emission of greenhouse gasses.143

Article XX (a): measures necessary to protect public morals
Thus far, Art. XX(b) and XX(g) have served as the primary justifications for
environment-related trade measures. However, in recent years, the possible use of Art. XX(a) for
the defense of environmental measures has begun to be explored. This article allows for the
justification of trade measures intended to protect against things considered to be a violation of a
generally accepted moral concern of a member state.
To be used to justify a trade measure, the member state must first establish that a given
shared moral value actually exists. In the case US – Gambling, the first case in which Art. XX(a)
was used to justify a trade measure, “public morals” were defined by the panel as “standards of
right and wrong conduct maintained by or on behalf of a community or nation.”144 The content of
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these standards “can vary in time and space, depending upon a range of factors, including
prevailing social, cultural, ethical and religious values.”145 The panel further clarified that
member states “should be given some scope to define and apply for themselves the concepts of
'public morals' ... in their respective territories, according to their own systems and scales of
values.”146 In the case Colombia – Textiles, the AB clarified that a contested measure must be
both “designed” and “necessary” to protect the stated public moral concern to be justified under
Art. XX(a).147
Although the original intent of this measure was likely to provide for the prohibition of
things such as gambling and pornography, the use of this exemption has been expanded in recent
years. The 2014 dispute EC – Seal Products opened the door for the use of XX(a) in the defense
of future conservation-related trade measures. In this case, the EC sought to use Art. XX(a) to
justify a ban on the importation and sale of seals and seal products within the EU. The EC
claimed that the ban was introduced to “address the moral concerns of the EU public with regard
to the welfare of seals.”148 The objective of this measure was to address two issues: “(a) the
‘incidence of inhumane killing of seals;’ and, (b) EU citizens' ‘individual and collective
participation as consumers in, and exposure to the economic activity which sustains the market
for’ seal products derived from inhumane hunts.”149
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Canada, one complainant in the case and a major exporter of seal products, argued that
the ban was hypocritical, as “the animal welfare risks associated with seal hunts” were no higher
than those “associated with slaughterhouses and other terrestrial wildlife hunts.”150 Therefore,
“EU policies and practices with respect to animal welfare included a tolerance for a certain
degree of animal suffering.”151 The AB, however, rejected Canada’s argument, stating that
member states are not required to “regulate similar public moral concerns in similar ways.”152
Ultimately, the AB agreed with the EU that a ban on seal products could be justified under Art.
XX(a), but found several issues with the ban’s exception for seals hunted by indigenous
communities.153 For this reason, like Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, US – Shrimp, and US – Gasoline,
the AB ruled that the ban was “applied in a manner that constitutes a means of arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination” and therefore did not comply with the requirements of the Art. XX
chapeau.154
While Art. XX(a) does not provide as straightforward of a path to justifying the CBAM
as do Articles XX(b) and XX(g), the EU should not rule the exemption out as a possible defense.
Because a “public moral” is such a subjective concept, panels in the past have proven wary of
denying XX(a) defenses at the risk of being seen as overly intrusive. For this reason, the EU may
very well be successful in creating a XX(a) defense that defines issues of climate justice brought
about by climate change as at odds with the public morals of the EU. As evidenced by so many
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environment-related WTO disputes discussed in this chapter, the largest challenge to an Art. XX
defense of the EU’s CBAM may not come from proving that the measure falls within the scope
of XX(b), XX(g), or XX(a), but from proving that the measure complies with the Art. XX
chapeau. However, the terms of the chapeau may just be too narrow for ambitious measures like
the CBAM to comply with.
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Chapter 3 – The WTO and Climate Action
Sustainable Development and the WTO
The preamble of the GATT, originally written in 1947, states that the goal of trade
liberalization can be articulated as “raising standards of living, ensuring full employment and a
large and steadily volume of real income and effective demand, developing the full use of the
resources of the world and expanding the production and exchange of goods.”155 This idea was
further elaborated in the 1994 Marrakesh Agreement, which established the WTO as the
successor to the GATT. Also known as the WTO Agreement, this agreement states in its
preamble that all trade relations within the new WTO should be “conducted with a view to
raising standards of living, ensuring full employment and a large and steadily growing volume of
real income and effective demand, and expanding the production of trade in goods and services,
while allowing for the optimal use of the world’s resources in accordance with the objective of
sustainable development, seeking both to protect and preserve the environment and to enhance
the means for doing so in a manner consistent with their respective needs and concerns at
different levels of economic development.”156
Therefore, if preambular language is to be believed, the concept of using trade
liberalization in the name of social welfare can be seen as the focus of the GATT since its
creation. Furthermore, environmental protection, sustainable development, and the recognition of
the differential abilities of developed and developing states to act thereon are primary objectives
of the WTO. While these statements carry no actual legal weight, Antonia Eliason explains that
155
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this preambular language “provides the first line of justification for using the WTO, both as a
rule-making organization and as a dispute settlement body, in helping to ensure effective
implementation of climate change mitigation and adaptation measures by WTO members.”157
Outside of the WTO Agreement’s preamble, the WTO’s commitment to environmental
protection is codified in the Art. XX exceptions of the GATT 1994. As explained in the previous
chapter, the Art. XX(b) and XX(g) exceptions were designed with the intention of allowing for
trade measures aimed at environmental protection and resource conservation that would
otherwise violate WTO rules, provided that they are not found to be unjustifiably discriminatory
nor a “disguised restriction on international trade.”158 As mentioned above, Art. XX(a), allowing
for measures aimed at protecting public morals, has emerged as another possible pathway for the
defense of environment-related measures. While the GATT Art. XX exceptions apply only to the
trade of goods, Art. XIV(a) and XIV(b) of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)
allow for similar protections to service sectors.159 Together, these GATT and GATS exceptions
serve as the sole pathway for member states to justify trade-related climate action.
While the agreements of the WTO define the rules of global trade, the framework of
international environmental law is comprised of a number of multilateral environmental
agreements (MEAs). If we are to view mitigating and adapting to climate change as core
principles of sustainable development, then it is logical to view the goals of the Paris Agreement,
the most significant MEA on climate change, as fundamental to achieving sustainable
development.
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Article 3.5 of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC), within the framework of which the Paris Agreement operates, states that “Parties
should cooperate to promote a supportive and open international economic system that would
lead to sustainable economic growth and development in all Parties, particularly developing
country Parties, thus enabling them to better address the problems of climate change. Measures
taken to combat climate change, including unilateral ones, should not constitute a means of
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade.”160
However, despite WTO’s commitment to the objective of sustainable development and
the UNFCCC’s requirement that parties adhere to the rules of international trade, a disconnect
between the trade and climate regimes remains. The following section explains several ways in
which the current WTO framework creates barriers to effective climate action.

Barriers to Facilitating the Paris Agreement
In “Sustainable Development as a Principle of International Law: Resolving Conflicts
between Climate Measures and WTO Law,” Christina Voigt writes that the relationship between
MEAs that allow for restrictions on trade to achieve their objectives and WTO rules remains
unclear.161 The current WTO system, she explains, has a “deterring effect on ongoing multilateral
environmental negotiations, which are becoming increasingly self-censoring in terms of trade
restrictiveness.”162 Voigt refers to this deterring effect as the “chill factor.”163
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It should be noted that, while there are at least twenty MEAs that contain provisions that
affect trade, there has not yet been a direct WTO challenge to a MEA provision.164 These
provisions are mostly product or commodity specific and often define the regulatory schemes for
parties to the treaty to follow.165 For instance, agreements like the Convention on International
Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, the Basel Convention on the Control of
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, and the Montreal Protocol
on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer address the trade of endangered species, hazardous
wastes, and ozone-depleting substances respectively, all of which are unlikely to have a large
impact on the global economy.166 The “chill factor” that Voigt describes has perhaps prevented
the inclusion of more ambitious trade measures into MEAs.
This fear of butting heads with the rules of the WTO may also be why the Paris
Agreement does not contain any direct trade provisions to enforce the reduction of global carbon
emissions. While the Paris Agreement has been celebrated for its universality (being signed by
nearly every country in the world) and binding nature, the agreement takes a more conservative
approach to climate mitigation by calling for parties to pledge their own emissions reduction
targets, known as nationally determined contributions (NDCs). The rapid scaling down of carbon
emissions needed to achieve these NDCs will almost certainly require countries to adopt tradeaffecting measures. As of 2017, around 45 percent of all pledged NDCs included a direct
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reference to trade or trade measures.167 As these trade measures are put into effect, the Paris
Agreement will almost certainly result in friction with WTO rules that MEAs in the past have
mostly been able to avoid.168 In leaving parties on their own to figure out how to achieve their
reduction targets without running afoul of trade rules, the Paris Agreement only shifts the burden
of navigating a WTO dispute to its parties.
As mentioned in the previous chapter, trade measures aimed at environmental protection
are particularly vulnerable to violating GATT rules such as the most-favored-nation and national
treatment provisions. Often whether or not a measure violates these rules comes down to the
definition of “like products,” as measures aimed at reducing carbon emissions, like the EU’s
CBAM, differentiate between similar products based on the sustainability of their production
methods.169 However, as explained by the AB in case Japan–Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages,
“[t]here can be no one precise and absolute definition of what is ‘like’.”170 Determining likeness
therefore involves an “unavoidable element of individual, discretionary judgment.”171 This
essentially means that the legality of trade measures designed to encourage cleaner
manufacturing processes is at the mercy of the panel or AB’s interpretation of WTO provisions.
While measures found to violate either the most-favored-nation or national treatment rule may
still be justified under the Art. XX exceptions, the trouble with this system is that countries
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seeking to implement such measures have no choice but to navigate the WTO’s dispute
settlement system, which is time-consuming and expensive.
Like the variable definition of “like products,” the rulebook of what types of
environment-related measures the panel or AB will and will not allow to be justified under Art.
XX remains both complicated and vague. This is because the Art. XX(b), XX(g), or XX(a) have
only been brought up in the WTO’s dispute settlement process for the explicit purpose of
environmental protection a limited number of times. This leaves a small number of trade
measures defended under Art. XX to serve as a precedent for how to arbitrate emerging climate
measures. Without a strong precedent, Voigt writes that “power and interest differences in the
panels or the AB could easily produce divergent outcomes” in arbitration, leaving a wishy-washy
record of what measures can stay and what must go.172
Furthermore, of the environment-related measures that have been defended in arbitration
using these exceptions, most have been found not to comply with the rules of the Art. XX
chapeau.173 In fact, of the 48 attempts of members to justify measures under any of the GATT
Art. XX or GATS Art. XIV “General Exceptions,” only two have ever succeeded. As Daniel
Rangel notes, “the impartiality of the legal system of any country in the world would be in
question if nine out of ten disputes are won by the complaining party.”174 Furthermore, in the two
cases that have succeeded – US – Shrimp, described in chapter 2, and US – Tuna-Dolphin – the
measures in question were only allowed after the defending countries had adopted
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recommendations laid out in previous dispute settlements.175 No trade measure has ever been
granted an Art. XX defense on first attempt.
As demonstrated by the lengthy and careful development process of the EU’s CBAM,
WTO member states looking to implement trade measures aimed at addressing climate change
anticipate that claims will be brought against their new measures. The possibility of
implementing any climate measure then necessitates navigating the WTO’s dispute settlement
process. The vague rules regarding “like products,” as well as the lack of precedent and
unsuccessful record of Art. XX defenses, leaves countries with no guarantee that their time will
be worthwhile. This seemingly inevitable dispute resolution and uncertain outcome may
discourage the development of innovative trade measures altogether, indicating that the WTO’s
“chill factor” may also discourage unilateral action.
While this political chill may dissipate as more environmental measures pass through the
dispute settlement system, our rapidly-warming world does not have decades to wait for the
WTO to slowly carve out a climate rulebook one case at a time.176 The WTO dispute settlement
system moves slowly, with major cases often taking three years or more to pass through the
system’s various stages.177 Addressing the challenge of climate change will inevitably require
countries to conduct a major overhaul of existing domestic policies in the coming years. As
countries implement necessary domestic policies to meet their NDCs, such as the
implementation of cap-and-trade systems, internal pressure from domestic industries fearing loss
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of competitiveness will mount, as will the risk of carbon leakage.178 At the same time, as the
Paris Agreement has no effective enforcement mechanisms, the political will of parties to meet
their NDCs will inevitably wax and wane over time. To reduce emissions at the necessary rate to
prevent catastrophic global warming, other member states will therefore need a legal means to
create financial incentives or barriers to trade that will force their peers to fall into line.
Carbon adjustment measures like the EU’s CBAM could solve both problems. As
explained in chapter 1, the CBAM and similar measures are necessary to maintain the efficacy of
domestic emissions trading systems like the EU ETS. At the same time, these measures offer a
rare opportunity for countries to unilaterally encourage international climate action.179 However,
border measures will end up having “significant cross-border trade effects” and will therefore be
tested in the WTO dispute settlement system.180
The AB has sometimes taken MEAs into account when interpreting WTO provisions in
the past. For example, in US – Shrimp the AB references the 1982 United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea among a number of other MEAs in their interpretation of the meaning of
“exhaustible natural resources” in Art. XX(g).181 They also cite the GATT preamble as grounds
for their more lenient interpretation.182 Therefore, it is possible that an AB would also be more
lenient with finding measures that further the goals of the Paris Agreement to qualify from an
exception under Art. XX (a), (b), or (g). However, this would not exempt border measures from
the requirements of the Art. XX chapeau. The 96 percent failure rate of attempted Art. XX
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justifications indicates that the requirements of the two-tiered test may just be too narrow to
allow for measures developed in real-world circumstances.183 If the CBAM is unable to be
justified under Art. XX, there will be major implications for the future success of the EU ETS
and the EU’s ability to meet its Paris Agreement targets.
Furthermore, while the EU’s CBAM is the first major trade measure of its kind to take
effect, similar border measures are being developed in other countries, and more will come in the
future as countries attempt to scale down emissions.184 It is very likely that these countries will
wait until the EU CBAM’s fate has been determined to move forward with their own plans,
possibly years down the line. An unsuccessful defense of the EU’s CBAM would likely
discourage other WTO member states from trying their luck in the dispute settlement system
altogether. At the same time, a successful CBAM defense would not guarantee that other
measures find the same success, as the details of new measures will be unique to the political
circumstances in which they are created. Every one of these measures will have to move through
the dispute settlement process, perhaps multiple times. Such a case load could overwhelm the
already strained system, and, based on the record of past attempts, many or most of these
measures will find the challenge posed by Art. XX to be insurmountable.
Although the WTO and the global economic system as it stands have been called into
question for their incompatibility with the achievement of true climate justice and sustainable
development, many legal scholars have pointed out that there is potential for the rules of
international trade and environmental protection to be “mutually consistent, mutually supportive,
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and mutually reinforcing.”185 With this idea in mind, the next section of this chapter will discuss
potential avenues the WTO could take to better allow for climate action, particularly the agenda
of the Paris Agreement.

Rectifying Trade and Climate
Many solutions have been proposed to ease the restrictions that WTO rules place on
climate measures, the detailing of which would warrant a thesis of its own. The rest of this
chapter will therefore only explore two of the most sweeping and widely discussed possibilities:
the adoption of a climate amendment to the WTO Agreements and the creation of a climate
waiver. This section will not go into the technical details of such measures, but instead discuss
broadly the concept and feasibility of an amendment or waiver.
A WTO Climate Amendment
In light of the challenges that the current WTO framework creates for the implementation
of environmental measures, the most obvious and permanent solution would be to amend the text
of the WTO agreements themselves to accommodate measures taken in the name of achieving
the goals of the Paris Agreement.186 Art. X of the WTO Agreement allows members to propose
amendments to the provisions of multilateral trade agreements.187 Depending on the content, a
climate amendment could therefore be developed to clarify the legal uncertainty existing for
climate measures under the current WTO system, as well as lighten the caseload of the dispute
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settlement system.188 Suggestions thus far include amending Art. XX of the GATT to explicitly
allow for climate measures or measures taken in accordance with MEAs, as well as adding
exceptions similar to those in Art. XX to the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures to allow for green subsidies.189 An amendment to the GATT could also be written to
specifically allow for mechanisms like the CBAM.190
While a WTO amendment would be a powerful solution to the WTO’s current problems,
in reality, a radical change of this kind would be very difficult to achieve. To create an
amendment, a WTO member must first submit a proposal to the Ministerial Conference, the
highest decision-making authority in the WTO. The Ministerial Conference is composed of
representatives of all WTO member states and typically only meets every two years.191 After a
proposed amendment is submitted, the Ministerial Conference must decide to submit the
amendment to member states for acceptance either by consensus or, if a consensus has not been
reached after 90 days, by a vote of at least two-thirds of the conference.192 From there, an
amendment generally takes effect after two-thirds of member states have ratified it, although
some amendments may require ratification by all members.193 This kind of broad support for a
measure that would permanently alter the WTO rulebook would likely be incredibly difficult to
achieve. Furthermore, any amendment that is passed would only be binding for the member
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states that ratify it, with any states that choose not to ratify the amendment able to operate and
bring disputes against measures that violate the unamended rulebook.194
Thus far, only one amendment to WTO law has been successfully implemented. This
amendment, which makes permanent a decision on patents and public health to the Agreement
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), was adopted in 2005, but did
not come into effect until 2017.195 Even if a consensus could be reached to implement a climate
amendment of this kind, a decade is far too long to wait for the issues within the current WTO
system to be reconciled. While the idea of a climate amendment should not be thrown out
entirely, it is clear that short-term solutions should also be explored.
A WTO Climate Waiver
Some legal scholars have proposed the creation of a climate waiver in place of an
amendment. Waivers, allowed under Art. IX of the WTO Agreement, enable member states to
lawfully take measures that might otherwise be found to violate the rules of WTO agreements for
a specified period of time.196 Unlike amendments, waivers become legally effective as soon as
they are adopted by the Ministerial Conference and do not require ratification by members.197
Once a waiver has been submitted, the Ministerial Conference has no more than 90 days to
consider the request. If a consensus cannot be reached in this time period, a waiver may be
implemented with the support of three-fourths of members.198
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According to the WTO Agreement, the Ministerial Conference may only grant waivers
under exceptional circumstances, and the application of waivers must be subject to wellspecified terms and conditions.199 While Art. IX does not provide a definition of “exceptional
circumstances,” the precedent set by past waivers implies that a waiver is always granted when
all necessary votes are obtained.200 Even without this precedent, it is difficult to imagine that
climate change would not be found to qualify as an “exceptional circumstance.”
Waivers have several advantages that make them a more viable option than amendments.
For one, there is an extensive history of individual member states and a handful of examples of
groups of states using waivers to bypass WTO obligations.201 Notable collective waivers granted
in the past include the “TRIPS Waiver,” which was later made permanent in the TRIPS
amendment, and the “Kimberly Waiver,” which justified actions taken against non-participant
WTO members to suppress the trade of “blood” diamonds.202 These waivers serve as a precedent
for the creation of a climate waiver that would cover all WTO members.
Another advantage could come from the temporary nature of waivers. Unlike an
amendment, a climate waiver would not change WTO agreements themselves, but present an
opportunity for members to “to experiment by realigning relevant trade rules for the sole purpose
of addressing climate change without in any way changing those rules.”203 Waivers are often
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only granted for one year, and waivers exceeding one year must be reviewed annually. During
this annual review, a simple majority can vote to extend, modify, or terminate the waiver.204
While it is possible that this review period would make a climate waiver vulnerable to changing
political interests, it also presents an opportunity to adapt the terms of the waiver to meet
evolving concerns.205 Furthermore, the Art. IX requirement that waivers include a termination
date does not constrain a climate waiver to acting as a short-term solution.206 The TRIPS waiver
mentioned above contained a provision that it would only terminate when an amendment to
WTO rules that would replace the provisions of the waiver takes effect.207 A climate waiver
could include a similar provision.208
Bacchus proposes the creation of a waiver from WTO obligations “for all trade restrictive
‘climate measures’ that are based on the amount of carbon used in making a product, and that are
taken in furtherance of and in compliance with a UNFCCC climate agreement.”209 The core of
such a climate waiver should allow for trade measures that “discriminate on the basis of carbon
and other greenhouse gases used or emitted in making a product; fit the definition of a climate
response measure as defined by the UNFCCC; and do not discriminate in a manner that
constitutes a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on
international trade.”210 Such a waiver would apply to the trade of goods, but waivers could also
be created in relation to services and intellectual property. A climate waiver could also contain
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provisions to allow for the linking of emissions trading systems and encourage participation in an
international carbon market.211 Other possible provisions could prohibit fossil fuel subsidies and
allow for subsidies for clean energy alternatives.212
While a climate waiver presents a more politically feasible solution than an amendment,
it would likely still face challenges to implementation. As Art. IX requires that waivers must
contain specific terms and conditions governing their application, the creation of a waiver would
force the proposing party or parties to reckon with questions that both the trade and climate
regimes have yet to address.213 For one, the Paris Agreement and other MEAs have failed to
define what qualifies as a climate “response measure” or the exact terms of an “inefficient fossil
fuel subsidy.”214 A climate waiver would likely require precise definitions for these terms. Such a
waiver would also need to provide a common approach to calculating and verifying emissions
created in production processes.215
Achieving the three-fourths majority necessary to grant the waiver could also pose a
challenge. In October 2020, India and South Africa proposed a TRIPS waiver to intellectual
property rights protections for technologies relating to the prevention and treatment of
COVID-19. Despite the fact that such a waiver would end once “widespread vaccination is in
place globally, and the majority of the world’s population has developed immunity,” a number of
high-income countries, including the United Kingdom, Japan, Australia, and multiple EU
countries, have yet to support the waiver, citing concerns about the waiver’s impact on the future
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of pharmaceutical innovation.216 Unsurprisingly, a great deal of opposition has come from
multinational pharmaceutical companies, whose lobbyists have likely had a hand in the lack of
support from wealthy countries.217 In the face of global calls to work together to end the
pandemic, the proposed waiver remains stalled after more than a year of negotiations.218
If allowed under a waiver, CBAMs and similar measures would have a large impact on
global trade. This makes it likely that lobbies for a number of industries would put up strong
resistance to a climate waiver. If, as in the case of the COVID-19 waiver, these industries have
enough sway over their country’s government, a climate waiver could fail to gather the number
of votes it needs.
As Voigt explains, “the WTO Preamble demands trade liberalization to be pursued only
when it contributes to the objective of sustainable development.”219 Therefore, the WTO and the
Conference of the Parties (COP) of the UNFCCC – the decision-making body responsible for the
implementation of the Paris Agreement – must work together to reconcile climate and trade
rules. Any further procrastination risks “the legitimacy and longevity of both the climate and
trade regimes.”220 Furthermore, if the achievement of sustainable development is truly supposed
to be at the heart of all WTO actions and agreements, the question arises of why trade measures
seeking to further this objective, like the EU’s CBAM, must rely on exceptions to the rules in the
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first place. Perhaps a major overhaul of the rules of global trade that goes beyond the limits of
the solutions described above should be considered. In the short term however, if both a climate
amendment and climate waiver cannot be achieved, another solution must be found.
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Conclusion
In December 2021, Mohammed Chahim, rapporteur of the Committee on the
Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI) of the European Parliament, submitted a
draft report including a number of proposed amendments to the text of the CBAM proposal.
The objective of those amendments is likely to rectify several of the mechanism’s potential
inconsistencies with WTO rules.
As mentioned in chapter 2, the CBAM under the current proposal runs the risk of
violating the GATT’s most-favored-nation rule by considering the domestic emissions
regulations of exporters in determining which imports require the purchase of CBAM
certificates. To address this concern, the report recommends that no exemptions or reductions
should be granted to imports based on the existence of implicit carbon pricing or other emission
reduction policies in the exporting country.221 Instead, only explicit carbon pricing should
warrant any CBAM exemptions, and the Commission should meanwhile “engage in climate
diplomacy and find ways to cooperate with trade partners on decarbonization policies, which
should not replace the CBAM but instead exist next to it.”222 As previously mentioned, the EU
could also violate the “national treatment” rule by continuing the issuance of free emissions
allowances after the CBAM has been implemented. Chahim therefore proposes a faster timeline
for the phase-out of free allowances, with the CBAM and free allowances coexisting for a shorter
period.223
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Chahim also proposes that the Commission include that Art. XX of the GATT “allows
World Trade Organization (WTO) members to implement measures that are necessary to protect
human, animal or plant life or health, or natural resources” in the beginning of the proposal,
indicating that the EU is prepared to defend the CBAM under either Art. XX(b) or XX(g).224
Other proposed amendments could strengthen the chances of a successful Art. XX defense. For
one, the report explicitly states that the CBAM is a “carbon leakage mechanism” necessary to
replace the current leakage-reduction policy of issuing free allowances in order to support the
reduction of emissions in the EU and that a primary purpose of the CBAM is to provide an
incentive to third countries to reduce emissions.225 Chahim further recommends that the CBAM
includes the import of organic basic chemicals, hydrogen and polymers and is also applied to
indirect emissions from the onset.226 In broadening its scope, the report claims that the CBAM
would closer mirror the scope of the EU ETS, as “coherence between the CBAM and the EU
ETS are essential to respect the principles of the WTO.”227 By emphasizing the necessity of the
CBAM to reduce global emissions and tying its rules more closely to those of the EU ETS, these
amendments would support the EU’s case that the CBAM falls within the scope of one of the
Art. XX general exceptions.
Such amendments could also increase the chances that the CBAM meets the terms of the
chapeau, the second tier of the Art. XX test. Chahim suggests a major overhaul of the proposal’s
decentralized system of regulation in favor of establishing a singular EU “CBAM authority” to
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facilitate the registration of importers and sale of certificates.228 Revenues generated by the
CBAM would directly fund the operation of the CBAM authority, with remaining revenue going
to the EU budget. Furthermore, an amount equivalent to the revenue of the CBAM should be
provided by EU member states to support the decarbonization of manufacturing industries in
least developed countries.229 If adopted, this change could challenge any skepticism that profit is
a motivation behind the measure, as well as further present the CBAM as in line with the EU’s
“objectives and international commitments…under WTO agreements and the Paris
Agreement.”230
Chahim’s draft report is expected to be voted on by the ENVI committee this coming
May.231 Though the ENVI committee’s final report will carry no legal weight of its own, it will
likely influence the Parliament’s position and shape the final text of the CBAM. The final terms
of the CBAM are expected to be agreed upon before July 2022.232
In February 2022, two months after the release of this draft report, the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change released the second part of their sixth assessment report – a 3600-page
document detailing the current state of scientific knowledge relevant to climate change. This
report, which UN Secretary-General António Guterres described as an “atlas of human suffering
and a damning indictment of failed climate leadership,” indicates that the realities of climate
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change are even bleaker than had originally been thought.233 An increase of 1.5C in average
global temperatures, the more ambitious goal of the Paris Agreement, will increase the
frequency, intensity and severity of droughts, floods, heatwaves, and continued sea level rise,
lead to widespread food insecurity, and create a high risk of extinction for up to 14 percent of
terrestrial species.234 These consequences will multiply with every fraction of a degree of
warming. Furthermore, even a 1.5C increase could make the strategies that we have developed to
adapt to climate change impossible or ineffective.235 For example, we cannot plant trees in cities
to alleviate urban heat if summers are too hot for the trees to survive, nor can we build seawalls
to protect coastal communities from flooding if sea levels have risen too high. And yet, even the
goal of keeping global warming below 2C will not be achieved under current emissions
reduction pledges.236
With Chahim’s suggested amendments, the EU’s CBAM could become the first-ever
trade measure to be successfully justified under one of the Art. XX exceptions of the GATT on
the first attempt. If not, the EU will still have the opportunity to apply the recommendations of
the Appellate Body, and the CBAM could very well be the third-ever measure to find success
after another round of the dispute settlement process. A victory on any timeline would certainly
be a victory for the EU and contribute to the global effort to reduce carbon emissions. However,
an EU CBAM success would not change the fact that other countries looking to produce similar
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measures will not have the same time and resources at their disposal as the EU to create
measures that perfectly thread the needle of narrow WTO rules and, therefore, will likely not
have the same success. Furthermore, a CBAM success would not change the fact that, as
explained in chapter 3, the WTO’s current exceptions-based framework for addressing
environmental measures slows the development and implementation of trade mechanisms
necessary to mitigate and adapt to climate change. For these reasons, Art. XX, a provision that
has a 96 percent failure rate, should not be seen as a “guardian of the environment,” and a legal
framework that requires several rounds of a lengthy and costly dispute settlement process to
allow for measures that seek to lessen the damage that globalized capitalism has done to our
environment should no longer be seen as sufficient to address the world’s needs.
The catastrophic consequences of human-caused climate change are no longer just a
threat to future generations – they are here now, many are already irreversible, and they are going
to get worse. As indicated by the IPCC report, the longer we wait to reduce emissions, the worse
things will get, particularly for people in countries who did not cause climate change and who
have historically only suffered as the result of global trade. The rules of the WTO, established in
1995, are no longer relevant to the world we live in today. The window of opportunity to
preserve the habitability of our planet is closing. A rapid scale-down of global emissions is
needed now, and the rules of the WTO must be altered to allow for it.
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